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DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE IN A SPORTS CONTEXT: A
REASSESSMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
INTRODUCTION
In a field such as the sports industry where employment decisions are
highly discretionary and not conducive to objective evaluation,' it is
often difficult to determine whether the dismissal of a union-affiliated em-
ployee constitutes an unfair labor practice2 in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).' Section 8(a)(3) of the Act makes
it unlawful for an employer to dismiss an employee because of his union
activity.4 At the same time, however, it is well settled that management
is entitled to substantial discretion in making employment decisions,5 es-
1. Scoville, Labor Relations In Sports, in Government and the Sports Business 203
(R. Noll ed. 1974).
2. "Unfair labor practice" is a statutory designation referring to any practice by an
employer or union that, because of its tendency to impair the peaceful resolution of indus-
trial disputes, is prohibited by § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(8) (1982). For example, an employer is prohibited from domi-
nating or interfering with the formation or administration of any labor organization, id.
§ 158(a)(2), or from refusing to bargain collectively with the employees' representatives,
id. § 158(a)(5). Similarly, a union is barred by the Act from, inter alia, striking or induc-
ing a strike in support of a secondary boycott. Id. § 158(b)(4).
3. Ch. 372, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
169 (1982)).
4. See National Labor Relations Act §8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). This
section makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." Id. It was intended, among other
things, to prevent employers from using the threat of discharge as a weapon to repress
union activism among their employees. See id. § 151; see also 79 Cong. Rec. 7668 (1935)
(remarks of Sen. Walsh) (discussing the use of economic power and other subtle means of
coercion against employees).
This section does not, however, prevent an employer from discharging or otherwise
punishing a union member for engaging in conduct that, although under union auspicies,
is not protected by the Act. See, eg., American Postal Workers Union v. United States
Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982) (discharge of employee who had en-
gaged in illegal strike); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1242, 1248-49 (7th
Cir. 1981) (discharge of union officials who had engaged in illegal strike); Indiana &
Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979) (same); Gould, Inc. v.
NLRB, 612 F.2d 728, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1979) (discharge of employees who had engaged in
illegal strike), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). Section 8(a)(3) is derivative of§ 8(a)(l),
which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§ 7]." National Labor Rela-
tions Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 7, in turn, protects an em-
ployee's right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of self-organization and
collective bargaining. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
5. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937); Paramount
Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 1980); Sioux Quality Packers v.
NLRB, 581 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950, 953-54
(7th Cir. 1976).
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pecially where such decisions are based on elusive, subjective criteria.6
Thus, there is a tension7 between an employer's right to discharge an
employee for cause ' and an employee's right to engage in union activities
without fear of management retaliation.9
Because of the high level of management discretion found in sports
employment decisions' ° and the importance of nonobjective criteria in
such decisions,"' it is appropriate to reconsider the traditional allocation
of the burden of proof in section 8(a)(3) cases.12 Similarly, the circum-
stances peculiar to sports labor cases invite a reassessment of the tradi-
tional remedies1 3 used to redress a discriminatory discharge and to
effectuate the purposes of the Act.
Part I of this Note analyzes the traditional burden of proof allocation
in section 8(a)(3) cases. It concludes that in situations, such as sports
cases, in which an employer's reasons for dismissing the employee are
6. See WNAC-TV, 264 N.L.R.B. 216, 221 (1982); see also St. Ann's Episcopal
School, 230 N.L.R.B. 99, 102 (1977) (court acknowledges that evaluations may rest on
subjective criteria, but evidence in case reveals sufficient objective factors to support
dismissal).
7. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963); see, e.g., NLRB
v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d 806, 813 (6th Cir. 1983); Republic Die & Tool Co. v.
NLRB, 680 F.2d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Nevis Indus., 647 F.2d 905, 909 (9th
Cir.1981).
8. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937); Marathon LeTourneau
Co. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950,
954 (7th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1972) (quoting
NLRB v. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 1965)).
9. See De Queen Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 744 F.2d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1984); NLRB v.
Steinerfilm, Inc., 669 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir. 1982).
The tension is best illustrated in so-called "dual-motive" cases. See Republic Die &
Tool Co. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 1982); Doug Hartley, Inc. v. NLRB, 669
F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 669 F.2d 547, 550 (8th Cir.
1982); NLRB v. Nevis Indus., 647 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1981). As the name suggests,
these cases implicate two plausible causes for an employee's discharge: the employer's
argument that the individual's dismissal was motivated by a legitimate business reason
versus the employee's contention that his discharge was caused predominantly by the
employer's objection to the employee's union activity. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B.
1083, 1084 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989
(1982). The adjudicatory body, in order to determine if there has been a violation, must
determine which of the two asserted justifications actually motivated the termination. See
Marathon LeTourneau Co. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1983).
10. See Scoville, supra note 1, at 203; see, e.g., Cotton, I Just Want to Have Fun,
Sports Illustrated, Nov. 30, 1981, at 28, 29 (claiming there was no sound reason for
management to change coaches of winning team) [hereinafter cited as Cotton I]; Wulf,
This Time George Went Overboard, Sports Illustrated, May 10, 1982, at 40, 45 (discussing
owner's disassembling of team after successful season). See infra notes 55-62 and accom-
panying text.
11. Scoville, supra note 1, at 203.
12. The current method of allocating the burden of proof in these cases was enunci-
ated in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982), and approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469, 2474-75 (1983). See infra notes 14-
21 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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grounded in peculiarly subjective criteria, the employer should only have
to articulate-not prove-a legitimate reason for the employee's dis-
charge as an affirmative defense to the prosecuting party's prima facie
showing of discrimination. Part II then suggests the remedy that should
be applied if adjudications in the sports context are to further the pur-
poses of the Act. It concludes that the employer should be ordered to
pay front pay to a union pension fund when the offending employer
might otherwise elude the the sanctions of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board).
I. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SPORTS CASES
In cases involving violations of section 8(a)(3), the burden of proof is
typically allocated according to the test enunciated by the Board in
Wright Line. 4 The test, approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., requires first that the General
Counsel 6 make out a prima facie case showing that the employee's pro-
tected activity was a motivating factor in the employee's dismissal."
Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to prove
that the employee would have been dismissed despite the protected activ-
ity' 8-- for example, because of his failure to obey factory rules 19 or meet
14. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cerL denied,
455 U.S. 989 (1982).
15. 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
16. The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) is
authorized by statute to investigate and prosecute unfair labor practice cases arising
under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982). These cases are tried in court-like proceedings
before an administrative law judge, whose decisions are appealable to the Board. See R.
Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 8 (1976).
Because prosecution of the charge is an enforcement, not a civil, proceeding, the ag-
grieved employee is not a party to the action. See id. For the purposes of this Note, the
prosecuting party will be referred to as the General Counsel, although prosecution is
typically conducted by attorneys from the appropriate regional offices of the NLRB. See
id. at 8.
17. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see, eg., Republic Die & Tool Co. v. NLRB, 680
F.2d 463, 464 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 669 F.2d 547, 550 (8th Cir.
1982); NLRB v. Nevis Indus., 647 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1981).
18. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see, eg., Zurn Indus. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683,
687 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983); Doug Hartley, Inc. v. NLRB,
669 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442, 446
(6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 651 F.2d 436, 437 (6th Cir.
1981).
19. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 822, 825 (Ist Cir. 1981)
(dismissal due to breaking disclosure of information rule; no violation); Florida Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 1979) (dismissal due to negligent work
habits; no violation); DC Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 385 F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1967) (dismis-
sal due to failure to follow company rules regarding reporting to work; no violation).
Wright Line, which established this standard, arose out of the discharge of an employee
for allegedly violating plant rules against altering time reports, payroll records and time
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minimum performance requirements.2 ° Such a showing amounts to an
affirmative defense and shifts the burden of proof to the employer.2' The
old test had required the General Counsel to prove only that the em-
ployee's protected conduct was responsible "in part" for his dismissal.22
Under Wright Line, in contrast, the employer is allowed to come forward
with evidence that the employee would have been dismissed for legiti-
mate business reasons regardless of his union activity.23
The Wright Line test was developed to balance the competing interests
of employees and employers21 in an industrial setting.25 Ordinarily, eval-
cards. See 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
20. See, e.g., EEOC v. National Academy of Sciences, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
11,010, at 4751 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (excessive periods away from work area); Hanover
Indus. Mach. Co., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 7 (May 22, 1984) (work performed
in unsatisfactory manner).
21. NLRB v. Tranportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469, 2473 (1983);
Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088 n.11 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
22. See Ajax Magnethermic Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 477, 477 (1976); Youngstown Oste-
opathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1976), enforcement denied on other grounds,
574 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1978). It should be noted that under this test it was irrelevent that
the employer had a valid reason for discharging the employee. See Jefferson Nat'l Bank,
240 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1073 (1979); 0 & H Restaurant, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1083
(1977).
Another test used by some circuit courts at the time was the dominant motive test,
which, when both proper and improper grounds for the discharge were alleged, placed
the burden on the General Counsel "to find affirmatively that the discharge would not
have occurred but for the improper reason." Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d
1292, 1293-94 (1st Cir. 1977); see Midwest Regional Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 434,
440 (D.C. Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1312 n.1 (1st Cir.
1971).
23. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
24. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088-89, enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); accord NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d
806, 813 (6th Cir. 1983); Republic Die & Tool Co. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 463, 465 (6th Cir.
1982); NLRB v. Nevis Indus., 647 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Note, Wright
Line and Wrongful Discharge Actions: A Uniform Standard of Review, 33 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 404, 425 (1983) (test balances interests of employers and employees) [hereinafter
cited as Wrongful Discharge Actions]; Note, NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp- Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Section 8(a)(3) Mixed Motive Discharge Cases,
33 Cath. U.L. Rev. 279, 310 (1983) (test balances competing legitimate interests of em-
ployee's right to engage in protected activities and employer's right to fire unworthy em-
ployee) [hereinafter cited as Burden of Proof]; cf. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 229 (1963) (recognized need to weigh, in light of Act's policies, interest of employees
in concerted activity against interest of employer in operating business).
25. For the purposes of this Note "industrial" refers to a workplace where goods are
manufactured or services are provided. Both Wright Line and Transport Management
arose in industrial contexts. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct.
2469, 2471 (1983) (bus driver dismissed for allegedly taking unauthorized breaks and
leaving keys in bus); Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980) (factory employee
dismissed for allegedly violating plant rule against altering production time reports, pay-
roll records and time cards), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
989 (1982).
DISCRIMINATOR Y DISCHARGE
uations of employees in such a setting are not complicated: An employee
generally must meet some minimum output requirement and some type
of quality standard.26 Therefore, unless an employer can prove that the
employee failed to satisfy these standards or obey the rules, the discharge
of an employee engaged in union activity is presumed to be
discriminatory.27
Wright Line's allocation of the burden of proof is apparently based on
the assumption that the employer's legitimate business reasons for dis-
charging an employee are objectively and readily provable. This assump-
tion is based on the premise that the accused employer has a fair
opportunity to refute the employee's charges.2" Concomitantly, failure
to marshal sufficient justification once given the opportunity to present
concrete proof would demonstrate that the employer's defenses are mere
pretext2 9 and that the employee was in fact discharged for unlawful
reasons.
30
26. See, eg., NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 456 (4th Cir. 1944);
EEOC v. National Academy of Sciences, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ' 11,010, at 4751
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Hanover Indus. Mach. Co., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 7 (May
22, 1984); Fabricut, Inc., 238 N.L.RB. 768, 779 (1978); see also Wrongful Discharge
Actions, supra note 67, at 426 ("[e]mployers typically present evidence of an employee's
violation of plant rules or company policies, similar disciplinary action in prior cases, and
an employee's poor work record").
27. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Discharge under these circumstances would
necessarily amount to a § 8(a)(3) violation because the lack of permissible grounds for
dismissal would vitiate an employer's claim that the employee would have been dismissed
despite his union activity. However, mere union activity does not shield an incompetent
employee from discharge. See id at 1086 (quoting Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977)).
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Instrument Corp. of Am., 714 F.2d 324, 328-29 (4th Cir.
1983) (employer claimed reason for dismissal was "business necessity"); NLRB v. Indus-
trial Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1139 (7th Cir. 1983) (employer claimed economic
reason for dismissal); Republic Die & Tool Co. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 463, 464 (6th Cir.
1982) (employer claimed reason for dismissal was employee's violation of numerous com-
pany rules, including one requiring the use of safety goggles); Liberty Men's Formals,
Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1303, 1306 (1981) (employer claimed reason for dismissal was em-
ployee's failure to work the required 40 hour week); Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 253
N.L.R.B. 871, 871-72 (1980) (employer claimed reason for dismissal was employee's tar-
diness and poor work attitude), enforced, 660 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 997 (1982); see also Wrongful Discharge Actions, supra note 67, at 425 ("It]he shift-
ing burdens of proof allow both parties to present their case with equal force"); Burden of
Proof, supra note 67, at 301 (Wright Line provides framework for establishing legitimate
justifications enabling employer to overcome General Counsel's prima facie case).
29. See, eg., NLRB v. Instrument Corp. of Am., 714 F.2d 324, 328-29 (4th Cir.
1983); NLRB v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1139 (7th Cir. 1983); NLRB v.
Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 692 (7th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Spielberg
Mfg. Co., 673 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1982).
30. See NLRB v. Instrument Corp. of Am., 714 F.2d 324, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1983);
NLRB v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1139 (7th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. Berger
Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 692 (7th Cir. 1982).
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A. Problems with the Current Test
1. Absence of Clear Standards in the Sports Industry
In section 8(a)(3) cases arising in an ordinary industrial setting, the
employer's alleged grounds for dismissal usually derive from disciplinary
rules3 ' or other clear, objective standards, such as the speed or quality of
the employee's work.32 In certain professions, however, no clear stan-
dards exist. Employees are hired and fired because of intangible quali-
ties33 that might be highly valued by one employer but not by another,
34
or because circumstances dictate weighing certain employment criteria
more heavily than others." This problem is particularly acute in the
sports industry. Although, as a threshold matter, an athlete's perform-
ance is evaluated on the basis of precise statistics and ratings, his employ-
ment status on a given team is also largely controlled by intangible
factors 36 that supplement or even outweigh the objective evidence pro-
vided by performance statistics. 37 For example, an athlete may be fully
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 709 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1983) (failure to
report cash fares); NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 456 (4th Cir. 1944)
(insubordination); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 202 N.L.R.B. 640, 640 (1973) (violation of
absenteeism rule); see also Wrongful Discharge Actions, supra note 67, at 426 (Wright
Line burden of proof satisfied where employer presents evidence of employee's violation
of plant rules or similar prior disciplinary action).
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 456 (4th Cir. 1944)
(poor quality of work); Hanover Indus. Mach. Co., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 7
(May 22, 1984) (work performed in unsatisfactory manner); Fabricut, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B.
768, 779 (1978) (low productivity).
33. See Hazlewood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 302 (1977) (hiring of
teacher based on such intangibles as personality and disposition in dealing with people).
34. See Canes, The Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality, in Government
and the Sports Business 83-84 (R. Noll ed. 1974); Noll, The U.S. Team Sports Industry:
An Introduction, in Government and the Sports Business 6, 7 (R. Noll ed. 1974).
35. See, e.g., WNAC-TV, 264 N.L.R.B. 216, 221 (1982) (personnel decision reflected
employer's effort to capture larger share of Boston television market); Cotton, Storm
Cloud Over a Sitting Bull, Sports Illustrated, Jan. 9, 1984, at 44, 45 (discussing need to
trade star player who failed to get along with coach) [hereinafter cited as Cotton II];
Cotton I, supra note 10, at 28, 29 (discussing dismissal of coach of winning team by
owner who felt change was needed).
36. See R. Lipsky, How We Play the Game 47-48 (1981) (discussing, for example, the
importance of players who are willing to perform "menial tasks" or who can substitute in
key situations); Deford, A Team That Was Blessed, Sports Illustrated, Mar. 29, 1982, at
58, 64 (discussing how team's least known player, by performing unpleasant tasks, be-
came most important player on team); Fimrite, Angels in Full Flight, Sports Illustrated,
Oct. 4, 1982, at 16, 18 (discussing how veteran pitcher gave pitching staff needed experi-
ence); Kaplan, The Padres'Persnickety Papa, Sports Illustrated, June 28, 1982, at 22, 23
(contrasting objectively low value of individual statistics against team's success); New-
man, Starring, but Not Starting, Sports Illustrated, Feb. 8, 1982, at 83, 83 (discussing the
value of reserve players); A Catcher's Worth: Measuring the Unmeasurable, Sport, Aug.
1984, at 63, 63 (discussing "inestimable value" of a catcher to his baseball team).
37. See Scoville, supra note 1, at 191 (noting that player who has limited ability, but
who has good attitude, is of enormous value to team); Deford, supra note 36, at 64 (not-
ing that "'the key'" player on team was the one who performed "grubby" tasks);
Kaplan, supra note 36, at 23 (manager dismissing value of individual statistics in light of
team's overall performance because players did things not reflected in statistics).
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qualified for his position in an objective or absolute sense, but may never-
theless be legitimately subject to discharge3" because of his failure to in-
teract well with his teammates39 or to adapt to the coach's style of play.4'
When such an athlete alleges that he was unlawfully discharged in viola-
tion of section 8(a)(3), the element of subjectivity in player evaluations
often makes it difficult for an employer to support his defense of legiti-
mate business reasons with concrete, unambiguous proof.4
Although all professions involve subjective employment criteria to
some degree,42 few rely as heavily as the sports industry on manage-
ment's discretionary assessment of subjective criteria in making employ-
ment decisions. Unlike those in an ordinary factory setting, personnel
changes on sports teams occur frequently4 3 and with only passing regard
for objective standards.' For example, a team may release one player in
favor of another with a measurably inferior performance record because
of management's amorphous but sincerely held belief that the second
player offers leadership45 or other qualities lacking on the team.46 A
player's worth is therefore essentially relative to the particular team.4'
38. For the purposes of this Note the trade of a player due to his union activity is
equivalent to a discharge and is included in the treatment of unlawful dismissals.
39. Dissension and discord may have an adverse effect on a team. R. Lipsky, supra
note 36, at 52-53; see Looney, New Philadelphia Story, Sports Illustrated, June 20, 1983,
at 32, 33 (discussing resentment players felt toward teammate who received more public
attention); Wolff, Bye-Bye, Pine Brothers; Sports Illustrated, Jan. 9, 1984, at 48, 50 (dis-
cussing ill effects that the quitting of two players had on teammate); cf A. Beisser, The
Madness in Sports 152 (1967) (discussing problems an athlete faces, including accomoda-
tion with teammates).
40. See Cotton II, supra note 35, at 44, 45 (discussing need to trade player who does
not get along with coach); see, eg., Cotton I, supra note 10, at 28-29 (discussing players'
failure to adapt to coach's system of play, although it was the coach who was dismissed);
Looney, supra note 39, at 33 (discussing how problems between player and coach affected
team); McCallum, Doing a Number on No. 1, Sports Illustrated, Sept. 21, 1981, at 58, 58
(example of disagreement between player and coach over what position player should
play); cf A. Beisser, supra note 39, at 152 (discussing athlete's need to accommodate his
coaches).
41. See Elmer Nordstrom, No. 2-CA-19101, at 44 (Nov. 23, 1983) (decision by ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ)) (appeal pending) (discussing whether Seattle Seahawks of
National Football League traded for wide receiver Roger Carr because of need or as
excuse to dismiss wide receiver Sam McCullum) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review).
42. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 225 n.7 (1982) (automobile
industry); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (aerospace and
aircraft industry); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 214 (4th Cir. 1984) (meat
processing industry); Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 741 F.2d 1486, 1495
(6th Cir. 1984) (medical industry); Hearn v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 739 F.2d 304,
308 (7th Cir. 1984) (printing industry).
43. See R. Lipsky, supra note 36, at 50 (discussing instability of work community
where players are cut and traded).
44. See, eg., Cotton I, supra note 10, at 29; Wulf, supra note 10, at 45.
45. See R Lipsky, supra note 36, at 48-49 (noting that an essential characteristic of
organization is leadership); Newman, Sonic Boom Turns to Gloom, Sports Illustrated,
Feb. 7, 1983, at 56, 56 (attributing team's problems to lack of leadership).
46. See supra note 37.
47. See Scoville, supra note 1, at 187 (noting that stardom is measured in relation to
1984]
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Determining a player's value is made even more difficult by the fact that
each player's performance is affected by the performance of others.48
This characteristic of employee interaction is thus of much greater signif-
icance in the sports industry than in a factory setting.
The Wright Line test appears to be inappropriate in these circum-
stances because it would require an employer to establish by objective
evidence a legitimate business reason that may rest entirely on subjective
grounds. An employer in the sports industry may have a legitimate rea-
son for dismissing a particular player, but because of its subjective na-
ture, that reason, however legitimate, may not seem to another person to
be a compelling cause for dismissal. Nor would it necessarily rise to the
level of proof required as an affirmative defense under Wright Line to
rebut the General Counsel's prima facie case.4 9 Although all employers
in section 8(a)(3) proceedings run the risk that their legitimate business
reasons may be rejected by the Board, 0 sports is one of the few profes-
sions in which an employer is expected to prove the cause for the dismis-
sal when producing a concrete reason may be impossible.
other players); Edwards, The Home-Field Advantage, in Sports, Games, and Play: Social
and Psychological Viewpoints 428 (J. Goldstein ed. 1979) (discussing how other players,
coaches, officials, and even fans can influence player).
48. See, e.g., Cotton I, supra note 10, at 31 (discussing how player's enthuasism
spread to his teammates); In Theory, the A's Owe '81 to the Outfield, Sports Illustrated,
May 10, 1982, at 100, 100 (discussing how outfield helped improve pitching staff); The
Unraveling Red Sox, Newsweek, Apr. 6, 1981, at 87, 87 (discussing how catcher's play
had beneficial effect on his team's pitchers).
49. See, e.g., Elmer Nordstrom, No. 2-CA-19101, at 58-59 (Nov. 23, 1983) (AJ deci-
sion) (appeal pending) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). The Nordstrom case
presents a good example of how difficult it may be to determine whether a player has been
dismissed in violation of § 8(a)(3). The case involved the dismissal of Sam McCullum, a
starting wide receiver and player representative for the Seahawks, prior to the commence-
ment of the N.F.L. strike in September 1982. Id. at 11. The Seahawks claimed they
needed a "deep threat" to help free their all-pro wide receiver, Steve Largent. Id. at 27
("deep threat" is a player who is fast enough to outrun defenders and who must therefore
be carefully defended by opposing team; as a result, other receivers cannot be defended
as tightly). They noted that they had two young, promising receivers, id. at 36, and that
they had traded for a fast receiver, Roger Carr, id. at 23. Carr's career, however, was
fading. Id. at 32. Furthermore, Largent had caught more passes than ever before during
the previous season with McCullum in the line-up. Id. at 13. McCullum also offered
numerous examples of confrontations with members of the coaching staff relating to his
union activity. Id. at 14-22.
The Seahawks' decision was highly subjective, and the Seahawks were not able to sub-
stantiate their belief that they suddenly needed a "deep threat." See id. at 44. The ALJ
concluded that the Seahawks failed to establish that they would have discharged McCul-
lum even if he had not engaged in union activity. Id. at 59. They therefore were held to
have violated § 8(a)(3). Id.
50. See NLRB v. Chem Fab Corp., 691 F.2d 1252, 1261-62 (8th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 456 (4th Cir. 1944); Martin-Brower Co., 263
N.L.R.B. 194, 225 (1982), enforced, 711 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fabricut, Inc., 238
N.L.R.B. 768, 768 (1978); cf. Sioux City Foundry, 241 N.L.R.B. 481, 481-82 (1979)
(§ 8(a)(1) case).
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2. Importance of Employer Discretion in Professional Sports
The subjectivity of employee evaluations in the sports industry makes
it necessary that management have broad discretion in its employment
decisions.5 1 Management discretion in this area is consistent with the
policies behind the Act. 2 As the Supreme Court noted in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.:53 "The Act does not interfere with the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to dis-
charge them."54 In the sports context this means that "coaches are pre-
sumed to be the best judges of their material and must live with their
decisions, [so] they have the undoubted right to sift out the unwanted
. . . and even to err in their judgments."5 5
The importance of managerial discretion has been recognized in other
professions in which subjective evaluations may similarly obscure an al-
legedly wrongful discharge.5 6 The difficulty in evaluating an employee in
the broadcasting industry was evident in WNAC-TV, s which involved
the alleged discriminatory discharge of a television broadcast journal-
ist.58 The administrative law judge stated:
[I]t is important to bear in mind that the standards for measuring ac-
ceptable performance in the industrial world do not translate well to
the TV industry. Factors such as length of service or bare competency
which might be sufficient to assure continued employment for an as-
sembly line worker, are hardly likely to guarantee job security for the
TV reporter. Evaluations of a TV performer necessarily involve sub-
jective judgment based on elusive criteria. . . . Reasons for preferring
one performer over another do not lend themselves to written rules or
precise quantification. In these circumstances, where wide differences
of opinion can flourish among well-intentioned experts, [the employer]
surely is entitled to judge for itself the standards it finds desirable in its
51. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
52. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937); Paramount
Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 1980); Sioux Quality Packers v.
NLRB, 581 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950, 953-54
(7th Cir. 1976). The Act states: "It is the purpose and policy of this chapter ... to
prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affect-
ing commerce ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1982). The policies of the NLRA include
deterring unfair labor practices, NLRB v. Otis Hosp., 545 F.2d 252, 257 (lst Cir. 1976);
79 Cong. Rec. 7572 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), making employees whole for
losses resulting from such practices, Otis Hosp., 545 F.2d at 257, and protecting victim-
ized employees, Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 591 F.2d 566, 570 (10th Cir. 1979);
see 79 Cong. Rec. 7570 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
53. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
54. Id. at 45; accord Paramount Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir.
1980); Sioux Quality Packers v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1976).
55. National Football League Management Council, No. 2-CA-13379, at 63 (June
30, 1976) (AL decision) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
56. See WNAC-TV, 264 N.L.R.B. 216, 221 (1982) (television broadcasting); St.
Ann's Episcopal School, 230 N.L.R.B. 99, 100 (1977) (education).
57. 264 N.L.R.B. 216 (1982).
58. Id. at 220.
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
employees. .... 59
Similarly, in St. Ann's Episcopal School," which involved the failure to
renew a teacher's contract allegedly because of his union activity,6 the
Board noted:
It is no doubt true that an evaluation of a classroom teacher's perform-
ance based upon personal observation may frequently be determined
by subjective factors. There are probably wide differences of opinion
among educators on the question as to who is a good teacher, but that
is not in issue in this case. Respondent is surely entitled to determine
for itself the standards it seeks in teachers. 62
Thus, the Board has recognized that in certain employment situations
management must retain the right to make employment decisions based
on subjective criteria. Inasmuch as decisions in the sports context are at
times similarly made without the benefit of objective criteria, latitude in
this regard should be conferred as generously on sports management. 63
B. The Need for a Different Burden of Proof
1. The Dynamics of a New Approach
In recognition of the onerous problems that Wright Line poses for an
employer in the sports industry," the Board should adopt a different
standard for such cases: The burden of proof should at all times remain
with the General Counsel. This means that the General Counsel has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that union activity
was a motivating factor in the dismissal. If the General Counsel succeeds
in proving his prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
defendent to articulate as an affirmative defense some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's discharge. Should the employer
carry this burden, the General Counsel must then have an opportunity to
prove that the explanations offered by the defendant were not in fact its
true reasons, but rather were a pretext for discrimination. Thus, the ulti-
mate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intention-
ally discriminated against the employee remains at all times upon the
General Counsel.
Under this standard, as under Wright Line, an employer is prohibited
from violating section 8(a)(3) by dismissing an employee solely for his
union activities. Although the ultimate burden remains with the plain-
tiff, the alleged wrongdoer is nevertheless still required to articulate a
legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with suffi-
59. Id. at 221.
60. 230 N.L.R.B. 99 (1977).
61. Id. at 99.
62. Id. at 102.
63. The proposed burden of proof, see infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text, may
be applicable to other professions involving equally subjective criteria.
64. See supra notes 31-62 and accompanying text.
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cient clarity. The General Counsel thus has the same information avail-
able to prove his case as he would have had under Wright Line, while the
employer is protected from having to sustain such a difficult burden of
proof in rebuttal.
As the Supreme Court has noted in another employment discrimina-
tion context, the fear that the employer may fabricate a reason for the
discharge when he is required only to articulate, not prove, a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory motivation for his actions is exaggerated. 65 The em-
ployer's explanation of his legitimate reasons must be clear and reason-
ably specific 66 in order both to rebut the inference of discrimination
contained in the plaintiff's prima facie case67 and to satisfy the require-
ment that the General Counsel be afforded a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext.68 Furthermore, although the employer does not
bear the formal burden of persuasion,69 he nevertheless retains every in-
centive to present credible reasons for his actions in order to persuade the
trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful.70
It is true that, by reducing the amount of proof needed to form the
employer's affirmative defense, this proposal forces the General Counsel
to overcome the same obstacles previously deemed too onerous for the
employer. This disparate treatment, however, is required if the employer
is to be free to make employment decisions based on necessarily subjec-
tive factors.7 1 There is a risk that some enforcement proceedings on be-
half of unlawfully discharged players will not satisfy this shifted burden
of proof, but the overall need for management flexibility in making em-
ployment decisions in professional sports outweighs the difficulties
presented in occasional, isolated cases.
2. Policies Supporting the New Approach
This proposed reallocation of the burden of proof is consistent with the
general trend in Board policy toward giving the employer a greater op-
portunity to overcome the allegation of a section 8(a)(3) violation.72 The
65. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1981) (Title
VII case).
66. Id. at 258.
67. Id.
68. Id.; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
69. Cf., e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)
(Title VII case); Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (same); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (same).
70. Cf Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)
(holding that imposing burden of proof on employee in Title VII case does not preclude
thorough examination of facts). There may be some question as to the applicability of
Title VII cases in this area. See infra notes 380-95 and accompanying text.
71. See, eg., WNAC-TV, 264 N.L.R.B. 216, 221 (1982); St. Ann's Episcopal School,
230 N.L.R.B. 99, 100 (1977).
72. See Herman Bros. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1981). Compare Ajax
Magnethermic Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 477, 477 (1976) (violation even where dismissal was
motivated only in part by unlawful reasons), enforced, 591 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1979) with
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trend is evidenced by Wright Line itself, which superseded the "in part"
test.73 That test unfairly disadvantaged the employer by preventing him
from coming forward with exculpatory evidence.74 Wright Line was in-
spired by the Board's need to determine the employer's true motive in
dismissing the employee75 and to provide an opportunity for the em-
ployer to come forward with such evidence.76 This attempt to correct a
perceived imbalance in the Act's application is also evidenced by the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act,77 which, by prohibiting unfair la-
bor practices by unions, indicated Congress' increased willingness to rec-
ognize employer interests.78 Thus, freeing the sports employer from an
onerous burden of proof follows the pattern of recognizing management's
need for the freedom to make the employment decisions it deems
necessary.
Assigning the burden of proof in this manner is also consistent with
the reasoning behind the Wright Line test.79 In that case the Board,
quoting the Supreme Court, observed:
[I]t is fundamental in "situations present[ing] a complex of motives"
that the decisional body be able to accomplish the "delicate task" of
"weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against the
interest of the employer in operating his business in a particular man-
ner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended
Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980) (violation only where employer fails to
prove that employee would have been discharged regardless of protected conduct), en-
forced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
73. Wright.Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
74. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1084 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); see also Zum Indus. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d
683, 686-87 (9th Cir. 1982) (under "in part" test General Counsel only had to show
presence of prohibited motives); Herman Bros. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 201, 208 (3d Cir.
1981) (under "in part" test employer violates § 8(a)(3) if only part of reason for dismissal
was unlawful).
75. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
76. Id.; see NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469, 2474
(1983).
77. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982). The Supreme Court has recognized the role of the
Taft-Hartley Act in balancing management prerogative in employment decisions against
the right of employees to be free from discrimination based on their union affiliation. As
Justice Felix Frankfurter observed in Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB:
It is relevant to recall that the Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked degree, the
result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply
held views on the role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation
and the appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled power of
management and labor to further their respective interests.
357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958).
79. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088-89 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); Jackson & Heller, The Irrelevance of the
Wright Line Debate: Returning to the Realism of Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor Practice
Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. Rev. 737, 744 (1983).
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consequences upon employee rights against the business ends to be
served by the employer's conduct." 0
In a factory setting-where employees can be measured by objective
standards-placing the burden of proof on the employer to make out an
afirmative defense after the General Counsel makes its prima facie case
successfully balances the interests of employers and employees."' How-
ever, where there are no such standards to which the employer may refer
in assessing an employee's performance, the balance praised by Wright
Line is skewed against the employer.8" Eliminating the requirement that
the employer prove rather than merely articulate an affirmative defense 3
would therefore limit the harm that can result from a misinterpretation
of the employer's motives. This allocation of the burden of proof achieves
a new balance dictated by the circumstances and as such is responsive to
and consistent with the considerations underlying Wright Line."
This shift is also consistent with the allocation of the burden of proof
in Title VII cases, which, like section 8(a)(3) violations, concern the dis-
criminatory discharge of employees.8 5 Moreover, both Title VII and the
NLRA are intended to discourage employers from engaging in employ-
ment discrimination and to compensate discrimination victims.8 6 In Ti-
tle VII cases, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the plaintiff at all
times.87 The employee is charged first with proving his prima facie case
of discrimination 8 and then with rebutting any nondiscriminatory expla-
nation the employer presents for the dismissal.89 This allocation of the
burden of proof seems to be motivated primarily by the court's respect
80. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980) (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1963)), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 989 (1982).
81. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
85. Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
86. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (discussion of pur-
poses of Title VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (same);
Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); Di Salvo v. Chamber of
Commerce, 568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978) (same). For a discussion of the purposes of
the NLRA, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
87. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); see
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Casillas v. United States Navy, 735
F.2d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1307
(8th Cir. 1984).
88. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Fowler v. Blue Bell,
Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1010 (11th Cir. 1984); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010,
1014 (1st Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 222 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3236 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1984) (No. 83-1779).
89. See McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 219 (3d Cir.), petition for cert
filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3326 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984) (No. 84-578); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh
Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Dec. 11,
1984) (No. 84-601); Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir.
1984); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1040 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3324
(U.S. Oct. 30, 1984) (No. 84-307).
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for management discretion in the selection and discharge of employees
and reflects the principle that the court will interfere with such discretion
only after the employee has proven a strong case of discrimination.
The Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of whether the Title VII
burden of proof may be used by analogy to support a similar allocation in
labor cases. In a footnote to its decision in NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp.,9° which involved a standard industrial setting,9 the
Court found a Title VII case proffered by the employer to support such a
shift to be "inapposite."9" However, it did not seem to object to the value
of the Title VII analogy generally; rather, it questioned the employer's
use of a pretext discrimination case to illuminate the dual motive case
before it.93
Thus, shifting the burden of proof in dual motive cases in the sports
context can be justified on the strength of its similarity to civil rights
remedial legislation, its consistency with the principles underlying
Wright Line and its compatibility with general trends in the field of labor
law.
II. REMEDIES
A. Problems with Traditional Remedies
Once the Board finds a violation, section 10(c)94 allows it to order any
remedy appropriate to rectify the offense.95 Reinstatement and back pay
are the typical remedies for a violation of section 8(a)(3): 96 The em-
ployee is reinstated to his former position and is awarded back pay for
the period of time between his dismissal and his reinstatement.97 The
90. 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983).
91. Id. at 2470 (dismissal of bus driver).
92. Id. at 2473 n.5.
93. See id. The Court did not foreclose the use of the Title VII burden of proof in§ 8(a)(3) cases if analogy were drawn to a Title VII dual or mixed motive case. It there-
fore would appear that the Supreme Court has left open the possibility of using the Title
VII burden of proof under § 8(a)(3) in the future. For a discussion of Title VII dual or
mixed motive cases see Brodin, Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 292, 292-326 (1982). But see Bur-
den of Proof, supra note 24, at 308 (issue in Title VII case is whether actual cause of
dismissal was illegal motive, while in § 8(a)(3) dual motive case existence of illegal motive
and violation are already established).
94. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
95. Id. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
96. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 S. Ct. 2803, 2814 (1984); see Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1941). For a general discussion of reinstatement and back
pay, see D. McDowell & K. Huhn, NLRB Remedies for Unfair Labor Practices 81-121
(1976).
97. See, e.g., Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir.
1978) (when employees are discriminately discharged, back pay obligation normally runs
until employer makes unconditional offer of reinstatement); NLRB v. Southern Grey-
hound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 1970) (same); see also R. Gorman, supra note
16, at 138-39 (explaining reinstatement and backpay); D. McDowell & K. Huhn, supra
note 96, at 81-84 (same).
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employer is also required to post a notice in a conspicuous place in the
plant for sixty days informing employees of the violation and the rem-
edy,98 including the employer's duty to cease and desist from his wrong-
ful conduct. 99
These traditional remedies are intended to return the employee to the
position he would have enjoyed had the violation not occurred." ° They
are highly suited to industrial settings where re-employment and back
pay will, without more, adequately compensate for the wrong. In a sports
setting, however, the consequences of a violation are not as easily recti-
fied. Reinstatement is rarely a viable remedy and back pay may be mini-
mal, if, for example, the discharged athlete is soon hired by another
team. 10 1 Therefore, reinstatement and back pay cannot be relied upon to
prevent future unfair labor practices.
Reinstatement is particularly inappropriate in a sports setting. The
delicate interplay of team chemistry, the uniqueness of talent and the
harmful effects of delaying relief makes these objections, although impli-
cated in other industries, virtually insurmountable in the sports context.
One problem arises from the inevitable delay between the actual viola-
tion and the Board's reinstatement order.' 02 Because most playing ca-
reers are heavily dependent on the athlete's physical condition and age,
reinstatement after the period of adjudication would often be ineffectual
and counterproductive. Reinstatement cannot re-establish the pre-viola-
tion status quo if the passage of time has diminished an athlete's employ-
able skills.103 Moreover, if a player is hired by another team after he is
unlawfully dismissed but before adjudication of his grievance, reinstate-
98. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 438 (1941); R. Gorman, supra
note 45, at 138; D. McDowell & K. Huhn, supra note 96, at 73; see, e.g., Wells, Inc. v.
NLRB, 162 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1947) (upheld Board's order to post notice); NLRB v.
Trojan Powder Co., 135 F.2d 337, 339-40 (3d Cir. 1943) (same).
99. See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 432 (1941); NLRB v. Local
445, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 529 F.2d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Scenic
Sportswear, 475 F.2d 1226, 1227 (6th Cir. 1973).
100. NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969); Nathanson v.
NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952); see Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197
(1941).
101. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
102. See, e'g., Elmer Nordstrom, No. 2-CA-19101, at 11, 61 (Nov. 23, 1983) (ALJ
decision) (appeal pending) (McCullum dismissed in September 1982 and reinstatement
ordered in November 1983); National Football League Management Council, No. 2-CA-
13379, at 61, 69 (June 30, 1976) (ALJ decision) (players dismissed during summer of
1974 and reinstatment ordered June 1976). A one or two year delay may not appear to be
onerous at first glance; however, in a league such as the N.F.L., in which the average
length of a professional career is 4.5 years, National Football League Players Ass'n, The
Check-Off Vol. 9, No. 2, at 2 (Aug. 20, 1984) (average player career lasts 4.5 years)
(available in files of Fordham Law Review), even a one year delay would amount to a
substantial loss for the employee.
103. Cf Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 297 (Ist Cir. 1978) (rein-
statement impractical in view of lapse of ten years and employee's suffering heart attack);
De Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 292 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) (six year delay made reinstatement impractical).
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ment would interfere with his new contractual arrangement. This would
in effect require his new employer-without any wrongdoing on its
part-to surrender the player's services if the player elects to be
reinstated. o4
Even if the decision is handed down quickly or if the player has not
joined another team, the problem of animosity between the coaching staff
and the reinstated player may inhibit the effective implementation of re-
instatement as a remedy. 105 Employees and their supervisors in a factory
setting are not a team in the sense that players and coaches are. In a
factory, employees join together to produce a product; how they interact
with one another does not, in relative terms, appreciably affect their out-
put.106 Players and coaches, on the other hand, are joined together to
produce an amorphous product: victories. Next to talent, teamwork is
the most important ingredient of that product.'0 7 Animosity is thus
anathema to a sports team: A successful team must function as a unit, in
which each member, including the coaches, respects the other's ability to
perform his job. When tensions arise between members of a team, the
104. The problem of reinstating a player to one team while he is under contract to play
for another team was recognized in National Football League Management Council, No.
2-CA-13379, at 65 (June 30, 1976) (AL decision) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review). The AIl held that the players who were discriminated against were
entitled to the opportunity denied them in 1974 to make their respective teams,
if they wish[ed] to avail themselves of it. Whatever legal complications [might
have been] involved as a consequence of transfer of any of them to other clubs,
[was] a matter which the Oilers, Eagles, and Steelers [would] have to work out.
Having created the problem, it is their responsibility to unravel it.
Id.
105. Cf Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984) (rein-
statement inappropriate in Age Discrimination Employment Act cases where animosity
exists); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.
1984) (same); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir.
1983) (same); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.) (same)
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957
(10th Cir. 1980) (reinstatement denied in Title VII case due to animosity between par-
ties); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1320 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(same), affirmed, 676 F.2d 1272 (1982).
106. Although harmonious interaction between employees and management and
among employees themselves is beneficial, see T. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan 90-
131 (1982); M. Saso & S. Kirby, Japanese Industrial Competition to 1990 12-18 (1982);
T. Uchino, Japan's Postwar Economy: An Insider's View of Its History and Its Future
233-37 (1978), it does not affect output to the extent that it does in a sports context, see R.
Lipsky, supra note 36, at 49-51.
107. See Laker Talent, Celtic Team, Time, June 25, 1984, at 60, 60 ("better team," not
team with most talent, won); see, e.g., Axthelm, A Season for the Shrink, Newsweek, Sept.
14, 1981, at 98, 99 (discussing team "known for getting the least out of the most talent");
Deford, supra note 36, at 64 (discussing how players' close interaction on the court en-
ables each to know exactly what the other is doing); Fimrite, A Well Matched Set, Sports
Illustrated, Mar. 10, 1982, at 90, 90 (discussing how each member of a particular outfield
is "capable of extraordinary individual exploits, but it is as a unit . . . that they excel");
Kaplan, Heavenly Days for the Angels, Sports Illustrated, Aug. 2, 1982, at 16, 16-25
(discussing cohesiveness and relaxed atmosphere that existed on first place team); McCal-
lum, supra note 40, at 58 (citing example of a coach trying to create team unity on losing
club). See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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mutual respect that bonds each member to his team is eroded and players
are distracted from their jobs. 108 For example, a coach who has unlaw-
fully dismissed a player will probably not interact well with him when
that player is reinstated. The harmony of the team is disrupted, to the
detriment not only of the coach and the returning player, but also of the
other team members for whose ultimate protection the Act was
designed." 9
Nor does reinstatement in a sports setting achieve the NLRA's pur-
pose of benefiting the victimized employee.110 Intended to make the
wronged employee whole,' reinstatement to an unappreciative team
may instead undermine that objective. After being reinstated, the player
is likely to see little playing time, either because of deteriorated skills
caused by the delay in reinstatement"1 2 or because of his coach's animus,
pride or reluctance to admit error should the player perform well. The
reinstated player would thus probably languish on the bench. As he
does, his value as a player declines: His skills may erode from disuse and
his professional visibility-necessary if he wishes to seek employment on
another team-would diminish. Reinstatement would therefore be
counter-productive to the player as well as to the team.
B. The Alternative: Front Pay
An alternative to reinstatement as a remedy for section 8(a)(3) viola-
tions in the sports industry is front pay. The purpose of front pay is to
put the injured party in the same position in which he would have been
had he been reinstated." 3 In the sports context this would mean that the
player is paid an amount equal to the remainder of the unelapsed con-
108. See Looney, supra note 39, at 33 (discussing the annoyance of players over the
attention received by another player); Wolff, supra note 39, at 50 (discussing reaction of
player to quitting of teammates); see also Cotton II, supra note 40, at 44, 45 (reasoning
that because coach was not using the player, trading player would be best thing for all
parties); cf Wulf, The Fight is Over the Red So, Not in Them, Sports Illustrated, June
20, 1983, at 24, 27-31 (discussing how problems in front office affected team). See supra
notes 39-40. But see Straight A's, Newsweek, Oct. 28, 1974, at 66 (world championship
team had "little respect for their manager, open contempt for their owner-and no par-
ticular affection for one another").
109. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 286 (1956); NLRB v. In-
tertherm, Inc., 596 F.2d 267, 271 (8th Cir. 1979); Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d
436, 442 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co., 474 F.2d 1155, 1159 (8th Cir.),
cert denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973).
110. See Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1978).
111. See Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 591 F.2d 566, 570 (10th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Otis Hosp., 545 F.2d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 1976). See supra note 100 and accom-
panying text.
112. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
113. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1320 (N.D. Cal.
1979), af'd, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); see Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742
F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d
1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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tract '" 4 measured from the date he would have been reinstated had rein-
statement been feasible until the date when the contract would ordinarily
terminate.
It may happen that an athlete discharged in violation of section 8(a)(3)
will be hired by another team soon after his unlawful discharge; in fact,
this occurred in the two reported cases involving section 8(a)(3) in a
sports context." 5 In that situation, the aggrieved player would still be
entitled to back pay for the short time during which he was unemployed.
But because his contract would most likely be assumed or renegotiated at
a similar wage level by his new employer, he would generally suffer no
additional pecuniary injury resulting from his dismissal.116 Therefore, a
front pay award to that player would serve no compensatory function. In
fact, it would result in a windfall: The player, in effect, would receive
payment on the same contract from both his old and new employers. At
the same time, however, failure to order a front pay award in that situa-
tion would allow the employer to violate the Act with virtual
impunity.11 7
To avoid awarding double recovery to the player on the one hand, and
to prevent the employer from escaping the consequences of the violation
on the other, the Board should order the guilty employer to make a front
pay award in the amount remaining due on the old contract to the rele-
vant player's association pension fund (pension fund). This contribution
would not be designated for receipt by the dismissed player at some fu-
ture date, but would rather be for the fund's general membership. It
114. Professional athletes who play for a team are required to be under contracts. See,
e.g., Major Indoor Soccer League Players Ass'n, Collective Bargaining Agreement 14
(1982) (available in files of Fordham Law Review); National Basketball Ass'n Players
Ass'n, Collective Bargaining Agreement 2 (1980) (available in files of Fordham Law
Review).
115. See Elmer Nordstrom, No. 2-CA-19101, at 23 (Nov. 23, 1983) (AJ decision)
(appeal pending) (player cut after preseason was hired by another team just prior to sec-
ond regular season game) (available in files of Fordham Law Review); National Football
League Management Council, No. 2-CA-13379, at 60 (June 30, 1976) (AL decision) (cut
player was picked up by another team three weeks later) (available in files of Fordham
Law Review). A player whom the Board finds to have been unlawfully discharged a
fortiori possesses talents that would qualify him to continue playing. It is therefore rea-
sonable to assume that other teams would seek to employ those talents when they become
available.
116. Under the general remedial principles of § 10(c), a player's former team is obli-
gated to pay the wronged player an amount equal to the difference, if any, between the
contract wage he receives from his new employer and the wage he would have earned
under his original contract with the former team. See, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling
Co., 344 U.S. 344, 347 (1953) (quoting Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., I N.L.R.B.
1, 51 (1935)), enforced, 303 U.S. 261 (1938)); NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d
447, 452 (8th Cir. 1963); cf Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 956-57
(10th Cir. 1980) (employee awarded front pay for five years, representing difference be-
tween her old salary and salary she recieved at new job).
117. See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text. If the player is traded instead of
being unlawfully dismissed due to his union activity, the team receives another player in
exchange, despite having committed an unfair labor practice.
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would also be entirely separate from any regular contributions made by
the employer to the pension fund pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement with the union. Under this plan, the player would be paid on
the contract only by his present team; at the same time, the payments by
the violating employer to the fund would serve to deter future violations
and simultaneously benefit the members of the labor union." 8
1. Front Pay is Consistent with the General Purposes of the Act
Although not necessary to make the injured player whole, 9 the front
pay proposal accomplishes other general purposes of the Act, such as
deterring unfair labor practices 2° and protecting employees in the exer-
cise of their section 7 rights."'
In a situation in which a player contracts to play for another team
soon after his dismissal, a front pay award to the pension fund would act
as a deterrent to future violations. In the absence of the front pay alterna-
tive, an employer who has committed an unfair labor practice would suf-
fer only negligible remedial sanctions for his misconduct."2 As noted
above, the guilty employer would be required to pay the employee only
back pay for the time between his dismissal and his signing with a new
118. In the situation where a player fails to obtain reemployment with another team
following his wrongful discharge, the player would be entitled to standard contractual
remedies. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-18, at 544 (2d ed. 1977). Damages
for breach of contract would be paid by his former employer, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
197 (1967); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 104 S. CL 424 (1983); see Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1155 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), in the amount of his contract as measured from the date of his wrongful
dismissal to the expiration date of his contract, see In re Arbitration between National
Basketball Ass'n and National Basketball Ass'n Players Ass'n, at 20 (June 22, 1978)
(arbitration ruling) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). In such a situation front
pay would be unnecessary. The issue whether a player is entitled to be paid on the re-
mainder of his contract if he declines reinstatement or if he fails to make the team after
reinstatement is beyond the scope of this Note, as are the antitrust issues that would arise
if a player who is a union activist is blacklisted by all the teams after his wrongful dis-
charge. The Note's discussion is limited to the situation in which a player is hired by
another team after his unlawful dismissal.
119. See supra note 116.
120. See, eg., Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 355 v. NLRB, 716 F.2d
1249, 1259 (9th Cir. 1983); Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 834, 840 (9th
Cir. 1981); Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305, 317 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981); Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir.
1978); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1547, 225 N.L.R.B. 331, 346 (1976),
enforced, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3413 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
121. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982); see, eg.,
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 287 (1956); NLRB v. Intertherm, Inc.,
596 F.2d 267, 271 (8th Cir. 1979); Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436, 442 (5th
Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co., 474 F.2d 1155, 1159 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 823 (1973). Section 7 provides, "Employees shall have the right to self-organi-
zation, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 124-30.
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team, and the salary differential,123 if any, between his old and new con-
tracts. At the same time, the employer would probably also be able to
evade his reinstatement obligation, because the injured employee is per-
mitted to decline reinstatement 124 and is likely to do so when he faces
animosity or inactivity125 or when he is under contract elsewhere. In this
situation, the traditional remedies falter, and the violating employer thus
has little incentive to refrain from future violations of the Act. 126
In theory, deterrence may be sacrificed in ordinary factory settings as
well. A situation allowing an employer to elude the Act could thus be
said to have been within the contemplation of Congress when it fash-
ioned these limited remedies.27 The typical factory setting, however, vir-
tually ensures that traditional labor remedies accomplish their deterrent
purposes. An employee in a typical industrial setting can often expect to
be out of work for some time after discharge. 128 As a result, the employer
may be forced to make a large back pay award. This expenditure would
amount to a fine from the employer's perspective (whatever its compen-
satory effects on the employee) because he is required to pay for labor
123. This amount is likely to be relatively insignificant, because an athlete is generally
paid what the market will bear. Therefore, there should be little differential between the
two contracts. If there is a significant decrease in salary it may be that the player was
dismissed for lawful reasons. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
124. See S.E. Nichols of Ohio, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (1981), enforced, 704 F.2d 921
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 275 (1983); Atlantic Business & Community Dev.
Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1529, 1529 n.3 (1978); De Marco Concrete Block Co., 224 N.L.R.B.
86, 86 (1976).
125. Cf Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984) (discuss-
ing the inappropriateness of reinstatement where animosity exists in case arising under
the Age Discrimination Employment Act); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984) (same); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc.,
703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Chancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d
1312, 1319 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin
Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980) (reinstatement inappropriate in Title
VII case); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1320 (N.D. Cal.
1979) (same) afl'd, 676 F.2d 1272 (1982). See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
126. Upon finding a violation of the NLRA, the Board will typically order an em-
ployer to cease and desist from unlawful conduct, see NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg.
Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969); Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952), in addition
to any other remedy the Board may impose. An employer who repeatedly violates the
Act in defiance of the cease and desist order will be held in contempt, see NLRB v. J.P.
Stevens Co., 563 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1977); C-B Buick, Inc. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 1086,
1096 (3d Cir. 1974); Dallas Gen. Drivers, Local Union No. 745 v. NLRB, 500 F.2d 768,
771 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Waumbec Mills, Inc., 114 F.2d 226, 235 (1st Cir. 1940),
but the consequences are insubstantial, see NLRB v. J.P. Stevens, Co., 563 F.2d 8, 21-22
(2d Cir. 1977) (company thought it profitable to ignore the court's decrees); NLRB v.
Waumbec Mills, Inc., 114 F.2d 226, 234 (1st Cir. 1940) (employers can make mockery of
Act if all Board can do is issue cease and desist order). As a result, the cease and desist
order will not by itself accomplish the purposes of the Act.
127. See generally 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.04, at 55 (C.
Sands rev. 4th ed. 1984) (when legislature fails to take action it is presumed they have
recognized the situation).
128. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1984, at 422 (104th ed. 1984) (average amount of time of unemployment in
1982 was 15.6 weeks).
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never received. In practical effect, this could operate to deter future viola-
tions. 2 9 In a sports setting, on the other hand, a wrongfully discharged
athlete can often find employment with another team quickly; 30 in fact,
if he cannot, it is possible there was no violation in the first place. 13 1
Front pay, as a financial outlay related to his unfair labor practice, would
therefore operate in the same manner as a sizable back pay award in a
factory context. If the Board's remedial orders lack this deterrence ele-
ment, the Act becomes a hollow shell.' 32
Front pay would also advance the purposes of the Act by reducing the
chilling effect on union activity 33 that the dismissal of a player represen-
tative may produce. 134 An unpunished dismissal would likely discourage
employees from engaging in protected activities in the future because of
their fear of reprisals 135 and because past experience demonstrates that
the employer incurs few remedial sanctions despite violating the Act.1 36
129. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
130. See Elmer Nordstrom, No. 2-CA-19101, at 23 (Nov. 23, 1983) (ALl decision)
(appeal pending) (player cut after preseason was hired by another team just prior to sec-
ond regular season game) (available in files of Fordham Law Review); National Football
League Management Council, No. 2-CA-13379, at 60 (June 30, 1976) (ALU decision)
(coach said dismissed player "was 'totally incapable' of playing football," but the player
was picked up by another team three weeks later and played for that team throughout the
year) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
131. It is possible that a player who is dismissed for being a union activist will be
blacklisted by the other teams. In that event the player would recover ordinary contrac-
tual damages and front pay would be unnecessary. See supra note 118.
132. See Scoville, supra note 1, at 204 (discussing the need for action against manage-
ment in the sports industry).
133. Cf J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 1969) (recognizing
need to remedy chilling effect); Concord Furniture Indus., 241 N.L.R.B. 643, 648 (1979)
(same), enforced, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2225 (1st Cir. 1982); Turtle Creek Convalescent
Centres, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 400, 404 n.11 (1978) (same); Hydra Tool Co., 222 N.L.R.B.
1113, 1121 (1976) (same); George Lithograph Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 431, 431-32 (1973)
(same); Plastics Transp., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 54, 58 (1971) (same).
134. See Scoville, supra note 1, at 208 (noting that player representative has greater
chance of being waived or demoted).
135. See eg., United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 994, 995-96, 998
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing need to avoid dis-
couraging employees from exercising their rights); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d
533, 540 (5th Cir. 1969) (discussing employee's need for reassurance after persistent vio-
lations); cf Wellman Indus. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir.) (discussing unlikeli-
hood of employee talking freely for fear of reprisals if content got back to employer), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Intertype Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 41, 45 (4th Cir. 1968)
(same), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969); NLRB v. National Survey Serv., 361 F.2d 199,
206 (7th Cir. 1966) (same).
136. See S.E. Nichols of Ohio, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 n.3 (1981) (company's history of
unfair labor practices led Board to modify AUJ's order to include broad injunctive lan-
guage in remedy), enforced, 704 F.2d 921 (6th Cir.), cerL denied. 104 S. Ct. 275 (1983);
see also NLRB v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 730 F.2d 870, 881 (2d Cir. 1984)
(dealt with recidivist union); NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 1976) (same), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Containair Sys. Corp. v.
NLRB, 521 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 533,
540 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding repeated violations had chilling effect). In Containair Sys-
tens, the court stated:
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The prospect of front pay would deter employer misconduct enough to
make employees feel more secure in the exercise of their section 7 rights.
In addition, front pay ultimately benefits the employees whom the Act
was designed to protect, 137 because the money paid to the pension fund
will eventually be distributed to the players after they have retired. The
front pay remedy thus advances the goals of deterring unfair labor prac-
tices and protecting employees from such practices. Moreover, in view of
the unsuitability of reinstatment in the sports setting, it is the only rem-
edy that can effectuate those policies. As such it falls well within the pale
of permissible section 10(c) remedies.
2. Front Pay is Consistent with Section 10(c)
The front pay proposal is consistent with the remedial provisions of
the Act. Section 10(c) allows the Board "to take such affirmative action
including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this subchapter."13 The use of the word "in-
cluding" means that "the Board has wide discretion in ordering affirma-
tive action; its power is not limited to the example of one type of
permissible affirmative order, namely reinstatement with or without back
pay." '13 9 This indicates that the drafters of the Act anticipated that cer-
tain situations might require variations on traditional remedies and en-
couraged the Board to employ them.
In J.P. Stevens and Co. v. NLRB, 1 ° for example, the Second Circuit
upheld the Board's imposition of a company-wide remedial order,' 41
which represented a significant deviation from typical remedies that are
aimed primarily at redress for the injured employee. The Board ordered
the employer to take affirmative steps in all its forty-three plants in North
and South Carolina, not only in the twenty where unfair labor practices
Without doubt the Board has a duty in a litigated case to employ broader and
more stringent remedies against a recidivist than those usually invoked against
a first offender particularly where normal remedies have proved to be ineffective
after earlier proceedings. Otherwise the Board might fail to carry out the man-
dates of § 10(c) of the Act ....
Id. at 1171.
137. Protection of employees is a well-recognized purpose of the Act. See Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 286 (1956); NLRB v. Intertherm, Inc., 596 F.2d
267, 271 (8th Cir. 1979); Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1978);
NLRB v. Midwest Hanger Co., 474 F.2d 1155, 1159 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 823
(1973).
138. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
139. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 539 (1943); see NLRB v. J.H.
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 262-63 (1969); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp, v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346
(1953); Phelps Dodge Corp v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1941); International Union
of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
950 (1970); Dixie Bedding Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 268 F.2d 901, 907 (5th Cir. 1959); NLRB
v. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 213 F.2d 209, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1954).
140. 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
141. Id. at 305.
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had been found.142 The Board ordered this remedy because it believed
that reinstatement and back pay alone would not overcome the employ-
ees' fear of reprisals, given that the employer had regularly committed
unfair labor practices. 43 As the court noted, "[A] back pay award
should not be a 'license fee for union busting' and. . . remedial orders
should not be disapproved merely because they are imaginative."'"
Although not expressly authorized by the statute, the proposed front
pay award to the union pension fund falls within the Board's wide discre-
tion to take whatever affirmative action may be required to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
3. Punitive Aspects of Front Pay Effectuate the Act's Purposes
In its most common application-ordering the employer to make pay-
ments to the pension fund in cases in which the wronged employee is
already fully compensated because of employment elsewhere-front pay
assumes a somewhat punitive function. Although ordinarily prohibited
on the reasoning that such awards thwart the conciliatory purposes of
the Act, 14 5 punitive remedies in unfair labor practice cases are not them-
selves forbidden by section 10(c). 14 Whether characterized as punitive
or compensatory, the remedy's legitimacy depends ultimately on whether
it effectuates the purposes of the Act.1 47 Reinstatement may not be
needed to redress the economic loss of a worker who has obtained an
equally profitable job after discrimination, but the Supreme Court has
held that to "limit the significance of discrimination merely to questions
of monetary loss to workers would thwart the central purpose of the Act,
142. Id. at 303.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 303-04 (quoting Staff of Subcomm. on NLRB, House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Administration of Labor Management Relations Act by
NLRB 2 (Comm. Print 1961)).
145. See Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961);
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11-12 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938); NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351,
361-62 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d 596, 602 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980); Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing
Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
147. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346, 348 (1953); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court in
Seven-Up said, "It is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect to the policies of
the Act. We prefer to deal with these realities and to avoid entering into the bog of
logomachy, as we are invited to, by debate about what is 'remedial' and what is 'puni-
five.'" 344 U.S. at 348. The court in United Steelworkers recognized the danger that
"purely 'compensatory' remedies may fail in some cases to effectuate fully the purposes of
the Act." 646 F.2d at 630. The court noted the possibility that reinstatement and back
pay in an unlawful discharge case may amount to a mere "license fee for union busting."
Id. (quoting Staff of Subcomm. on NLRB, House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., Administration of Labor Management Relations Act by the NLRB 2
(Comm. Print 1961)); accord J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 303 (2d Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
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directed as that is toward the achievement and maintenance of workers'
self-organization."' 48 The Board does not exist for the adjudication of
private rights; it acts in a public capacity to give effect to the policies of
the Act. 149 Therefore, when the goal of reconciliation is unattainable, as
in sports cases, it is proper to fashion remedies to accomplish the equally
compelling goal of deterrence.150 The front pay alternative effectuates
this purpose.' 5 1 In fact, because of the failure of the traditional remedies
to accomplish either reconciliation or deterrence, a broad ban on punitive
remedies would actually obstruct the policies of the Act in sports cases.
Front pay thus emerges as the only viable remedy to secure the public's
interest in the effective enforcement of its labor laws in the sports
industry.
CONCLUSION
In an industry in which employment decisions are highly discretionary
and in which wide variations concerning the value of each employee exist
among the industry's employers, the employers should be given much
latitude in hiring and firing their employees. This is particularly true in
sports cases when an employer is accused of dismissing an employee for
union activity. The burden of proof currently used in section 8(a)(3)
cases does not give such an employer the needed leeway, because in order
to exculpate himself from the charge he must prove a subjective motive
by objective evidence. The burden of proof proposed in this Note gives
the employer the opportunity to defend his conduct because it requires
only that he articulate a legitimate reason for the dismissal.
The unique nature of the sports industry also requires the adoption of
new remedies for section 8(a)(3) violations. The traditional remedies of
reinstatement and back pay are ineffective and consequently cannot be
expected to discourage a guilty employer from continuing to commit un-
fair labor practices. The front pay remedy provides the needed deter-
rence and ensures that the policies of the NLRA are fully effectuated in
the sports context.
Jeffrey Goore
148. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192-93 (1941).
149. Id. at 193; National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1941); Utility
Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1941).
150. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 119-37 and accompanying text.
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